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The  period  since  the  beginning  of  the  1970’s 
has  been  one  of  low  net  corporate  saving  rela- 
tive  to  previous  periods.  1  This  is  shown  in  Chart 
1,  which  compares  the  movement  of  the  three 
major  components  of  gross  private  saving-cor- 
porate  saving,  personal  saving,  and  capital  con- 
sumption  allowances-over  the  last  twenty  years. 
On  an  annual  basis  corporate  saving  in  the  1970- 
75  period  averaged  3.9  percent  of  gross  private 
saving  compared  to  an  average  of  12.1  percent 
the  previous  fourteen  years.  Personal  saving,  on 
the  other  hand,  was  unusually  high  over  the  same 
period  compared  to  typical  levels  in  previous 
years.  Also  shown  in  Chart  1  is  the  saving  (or 
surplus)  of  the  U.  S.  Government  as  a  percentage 
of  gross  private  saving.  It  has  generally  been 
negative  throughout  the  1970’s  to  date,  acting  as 
a  drain  on  gross  private  saving. 
While  the  unusually  high  levels  of  personal 
saving  and  the  long  p eriod  of  continued  U.  S. 
Government  dissaving  are  of  considerable  inter- 
est,  the  primary  concern  of  this  article  is  the  be- 
havior  of  net  corporate  saving  in  the  1970’s  and 
the  consequences  of  that  behavior  for  the  aggre- 
gate  corporate  balance  sheet.  The  first  two  sec- 
tions  of  the  article  look  at  the  determinants  of 
corporate  saving  and  consider  various  factors 
that  underlie  its  weakness  in  the  1970’s.  The 
next  two  sections  consider  the  impact  of  corpo- 
rate  saving  over  the  period  on  corporate  borrow- 
ing  requirements  and  interest  rates  and  its  cumu- 
lative  effect  on  the  corporate  balance  sheet.  The 
last  section  looks  briefly  at  the  role  of  corporate 
saving  in  the  “capital  crisis”  debate. 
Net  Corporate  Saving  Net  corporate  saving  is 
calculated  as  the  residual  after  all  other  claims  on 
gross  corporate  income  have  been  paid.  Table  I 
outlines  the  items  that  are  deducted  from  gross 
corporate  income  to  obtain  net  corporate  saving. 
The  first  step  shown  in  Table  I  is  to  deduct 
costs  from  total  revenues.  These  costs  include 
labor  costs,  material  costs,  and  indirect  business 
taxes.  In  addition  corporations  deduct  capital 
consumption  allowances  to  cover  depreciation  ex- 
’  In  this  article  “corporations”  refers  only  to  domestic  nonfinancial 
corporations.  Unless  otherwise  noted,  the  data  cited  in  the  text 
and  in  the  charts  exclude  profits  arising  in  the  “rest  of  the  world” 
and  profits  of  financial  institutions. 
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penses  on  plant  and  equipment.  JVhile  this  first 
step  seems  straightforward,  costs  for  accounting 
purposes  can  be  determined  in  different  ways. 
The  measurement  of  material  costs  and  depreci- 
ation,  in  particular,  has  been  a  matter  of  consider- 
able  controversy  in  recent  years. 
Corporate  revenue  remaining  after  the  deduc- 
tion  of  these  costs  is  divided  into  two  parts:  net 
interest  payments  to  holders  of  financial  claims 
against  corporate  income  and  reported  profits. 
The  sum  of  these  two  items  is  generally  called 
property  income.  The  major  distinction  between 
the  two  types  of  property  income  is  that  net 
interest  payments  are  treated  as  an  expense. 
Consequently  profit  taxes  are  paid  on  reported 
profits  but  not  on  net  interest  payments. 
The  third  step  shown  in  Table  I  is  perhaps  the 
most  difficult  to  understand  but  in  recent  years 
has  been  very  important.  It  consists  of  making 
two  adjustments  to  reported  profits  to  take  into 
account  the  distorting  effects  of  inflation  on 
profits  when  costs  are  measured  on  an  historical 
basis.  Until  recently  the  vast  majority  of  cor- 
porations  computed  reported  profits  by  deducting 
the  historical  costs  of  inputs  from  the  current 
value  of  output.  In  a  period  of  inflation  a  portion 
of  profits  computed  in  this  way  essentially  repre- 
sents  capital  gains  on  inventories  as  they  are 
going  through  the  production  process.  These 
Table  I 
MEASURES  OF  CORPORATE  INCOME, 
PROFITS, AND  SAVING 
GROSS  REVENUES 
-  Labor  Costs 
-  Material  Costs 
-  Tax  Depreciation 
-  indirect  Business  Taxes 
=  PROPERTY  INCOME 
-  Net  Interest  Payments 
=  REPORTED  PROFITS 
+  (WA  +  CCAA) 
=  OPERATING  PROFITS 
-  Profit  Taxes 
=  AFTER-TAX  OPERATING  PROFITS 
-  Dividends 
=  NET  CORPORATE  SAVING 
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Net  Corporate  Saving  I 
U.  S.  Government  surplus  \  - 
inventory  profits  cannot  be  used  for  taxes,  divi- 
dends,  or  expansion  of  plant  and  equipment  since 
they  must  be  used  to  purchase  new  inputs  at 
current  higher  nominal  prices;  that  is,  they  must 
be  used  simply  to  maintain  the  scale  of  oper- 
ations  of  the  firm.  For  this  reason  reported 
profits  should  be  reduced  by  the  amount  of  these 
inventory  profits  to  get  a  truer  measure  of  oper- 
ating  profits-profits  that  result  from  operations 
rather  than  from  inflation.  The  national  income 
and  product  accounts  (NIA)  take  this  approach 
by  adding  to  reported  profits  an  adjustment, 
equal  to  the  negative  of  inventory  profits,  called  the 
inventory  valuation  adjustment  (IVA). 
A  second  factor  that  may  create  a  divergence 
between  reported  profits  and  operating  profits  in 
a  period  of  inflation  is  the  computation  of  de- 
preciation  for  tax  purposes.  Corporations  must 
figure  tax  depreciation  (capital  consumption  al- 
lowances)  on  the  basis  of  historical  costs.  In  a 
period  of  inflation,  tax  depreciation  might  lag 
behind  true  economic  depreciation  based  on  re- 
placement  costs  of  plant  and  equipment  at  cur- 
rent  prices.  In  such  a  case  reported  profits  are 
overstated  by  the  difference  between  economic 
depreciation  and  tax  depreciation.  Alternatively, 
the  cost  of  capital  consumed  is  understated  by  the 
same  amount.  Another  problem  with  the  mea- 
surement  of  economic  depreciation  is  the  possi- 
bility  of  changin  g  depreciation  rules  that  do  nolt 
reflect  the  true  rate  at  which  capital  is  being 
consumed.  In  recent  years  more  liberal  depreci- 
ation  formulas  allowing  quicker  write-offs  of 
plant  and  equipment  have  been  introduced. 
Before  1976  the  NIA  corporate  profit  statement 
reflected  tax  depreciation.  The  NIA  have  just  un- 
dergone  a  major  revision,  however,  and  now  eco- 
nomic  capital  consumption  figures  are  based  on 
an  unchanging  formula  applied  to  replacement  costs.:! 
The  corporate  profit  statement  has  not  only  art 
IVA  adjustment  but  also  a  capital  consumption 
allowance  adjustment  (CCAA)  to  reflect  the 
difference  between  tax  depreciation  and  economic 
depreciation  as  computed  by  the  Commerce  De- 
partment  on  the  basis  of  replacement  costs.  As 
will  be  shown  below,  the  IVA  has  been  much 
larger  than  the  CCAA  in  the  1970’s,  although  the 
CCAA  has  been  steadily  increasing.3 
?The  procedure  is  described  in  [ZO]. 
3 Of  course,  the  size of  the  CCAA  depends  upon  the  formula  that  is 
used  to  determine  economic  capital  consumption.  Young  [ZO]  con.. 
tains  a  discussion  of  the  reasons  behind  the  choice  of  the  formula 
to  be used by  the  Department  of  Commerce  in  the  NIA.  Terborgb 
[IS]  has  argued  that  the  straight-line  write-off  assumption  used  by 
the  Department  of  Commerce  is  “in  most  applications  a  grievously 
retarded  measure of capital  consumption”  and  has  used  an  alterna.. 
tive  formula  that  results  in  a  capital  consumption  adjustment  that 
is  a  larger  offset  to  reported  profits. 
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deduction  of  profit  taxes  and  dividends.  It  should 
be  emphasized  that  profit  taxes  are  based  on 
reported  profits  rather  than  operating  profits. 
Consequently,  in  a  period  of  rising  inflation  in- 
ventory  profits  and  profits  due  to  under-depreci- 
ation  of  plant  and  equipment  are  both  taxed  at 
the  same  rate  as  operating  profits.  The  conse- 
quences  of  this  procedure  will  be  shown  below. 
The  Decline  in  Net  Corporate  Saving  ‘The  five 
measures  of  corporate  income  discussed  in  the 
previous  section  are  shown  in  Chart  2,  all  relative 
to  gross  corporate  product.  Net  corporate  saving 
in  the  1970-75  period  averaged  1.1  percent  of 
gross  corporate  product  compared  to  an  average 
of  3.4  percent  in  the  previous  fourteen  years. 
Several  factors  have  contributed  to  the  prolonged 
relative  weakness  in  corporate  saving  in  the 
1970’s.  First,  the  period  included  two  recessions, 
the  latter  of  which  was  very  severe.  As  the  chart 
demonstrates,  property  income  and  profits  typ- 
ically  fall  relative  to  gross  corporate  product 
during  recessions,  pulling  down  net  corporate 
saving.  Explanations  for  this  phenomenon  are  of 
two  types.  4  First,  prices  generally  are  viewed  as 
being  set  at  a markup  over  normal  long-run  costs. 
In  recessionary  times  output  and  productivity 
fall,  with  the  result  that  current  unit  costs  exceed 
normal  unit  costs.  Consequently,  the  difference 
between  current  revenues  and  current  costs  de- 
clines.  The  second  type  of  explanation,  not  neces- 
sarily  incompatible  with  the  first,  is  that  price 
behavior  relative  to  costs  reflects  demand  pres- 
sures.  As  these  pressures  decline  in  a  recession 
and  excess  capacity  develops,  the  spread  between 
prices  and  costs  tends  to  fall,  resulting  in  lower 
profits  and  saving. 
A  second  factor  that  has  had  an  adverse  effect 
on  profits,  and  hence  net  corporate  saving,  in  the 
1970’s  to  date  is  the  substantial  rise  in  the  percent 
of  property  income  going  to  net  interest  pay- 
ments.  As  shown  in  Table  II,  this  rose  from 
about  10  percent  in  the  mid-1960’s  to  around  23 
percent  in  1970  and  has  remained  near  that  level. 
in  subsequent  years.  The  rising  share  of  prop- 
’  A  review  of  price  determination  studies  is  contained  in  [IS]. 
Accounts. 
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result  both  of  the  changing  financial  structure  of 
the  corporate  sector  as  firms  relied  more  heavily 
on  debt  to  raise  funds  and  the  strong  rise  in  in- 
terest  rates  in  the  latter  half  of  the  1960’s.  AC- 
cording  to  most  views  of  price  determination 
relative  to  costs,  the  shift  to  a  greater  reliance  on 
debt  financing  would  necessarily  exert  a  down- 
ward  pull  on  profits,  since  a  greater  proportion 
of  property  income  has  to  be  directed  to  debt- 
holders.  (The  factors  underlying  the  rise  in  net 
interest  payments  will  be  discussed  in  more  detail 
below.)  As  shown  in  Chart  2,  property  income 
in  the  1970’s,  compared  to  previous  years,  has 
held  up  better  than  reported  profits. 
The  third  factor  that  clearly  has  contributed  to 
the  weakness  in  corporate  saving  in  the  1970’s  is 
inflation.  Chart  2  shows  the  widening  gap  be- 
tween  reported  profits  and  operating  profits  as 
inflation  accelerated.  The  IVA  and  the  CCAA 
are  shown  in  Table  III.  The  IVA  rose  sharply 
in  1973  and  1974  due  to  large  increases  in  infla- 
tion  and  substantial  inventory  accumulation.  The 
CCAA  has  been  small  in  comparison  to  the  IVA 
because  the  rising  divergence  between  replace- 
ment  costs  and  historical  costs  of  plant  and  equip- 
ment  as  inflation  accelerated  has  generally  been 
offset,  or  more  than  offset,  by  the  impact  on  tax 
depreciation  of  liberalized  depreciation  formulas. 
The  CCAA  increased  operating  profits  slightly 
from  the  mid-1960’s  to  1973  and  decreased  oper- 
ating  profits  in  1974  and  1975.  As  can  be  seen 
from  Table  III  and  Chart  2,  the  combined  effects 
of  the  IVA  and  the  CCAA  rose  throughout  the 
1966-75  decade,  jumpin  g  sharply  in  1973  and  1974. 
Table  II 
SHARES  OF  PROPERTY  INCOME 
($  Billions) 
Net  Interest 
QS a  Percent 
Reported  Property  of  Property 
Net  Interest  Profits  Income  Income  -  - 
1966  7.4  69.5  76.9  9.6 
1967  8.7  65.4  74.1  11.7 
1968  10.1  71.9  82.0  12.3 
1969  13.1  68.4  81.5  16.1 
1970  17.0  55.1  72.1  23.6 
1971  17.9  43.3  81.2  22.0 
1972  19.1  75.9  95.0  20.1 
1973  24.5  92.8  117.3  20.9 
1974  31.7  103.8  135.5  23.4 
1975  34.3  95.1  129.4  26.5 
Source:  Bureau  of  Economic  Analysis,  National  income  and 
product  Accounts. 
In  1974  inventory  profits  and  profits  due  to 
under-depreciation  of  capital  assets  rose  to  39 
percent  of  reported  profits. 
The  adverse  impact  of  inflation  on  corporate 
saving  was  accentuated  by  the  fact  that,  as  indi,- 
cated  above,  corporate  profit  taxes  are  paid  on 
the  basis  of  reported,  rather  than  operating, 
profits.  Consequently,  when  inventory  profits 
and/or  profits  due  to  under-depreciation  of  capital 
assets  cause  reported  profits  to  be  overstated, 
tax  rates  on  operating  profits  rise.  This  phenome- 
non  is  shown  in  Table  IV,  which  compares  the 
effective  tax  rates  on  aggregate  corporate  re- 
ported  and  operating  p rofits  over  the  last  ten 
years.  The  effective  tax  rate  on  reported  cor- 
porate  profits  rose  in  1968  due  to  the  tax  sur- 
charge  imposed  that  year  and  rose  further  in  19653 
due  to  the  suspension  of  the  investment  tax 
credit.  The  effective  rate  subsequently  fell  fol- 
lowing  the  removal  of  the  surcharge  in  1970  and 
the  reinstitution  of  the  investment  tax  credit  in 
the  second  half  of  1971.  The  fall  in  the  effective 
rate  from  1972  through  1974  resulted  from  the 
liberalization  of  depreciation  rules  in  1971,  while 
the  decline  in  1975  was  primarily  due  to  the  in- 
crease  in  the  investment  tax  credit  that  year. 
The  effective  tax  rate  on  operating  profits 
looks  quite  different.  In  particular,  effective  tax 
rates  on  operating  profits  rose  sharply  over  the 
1973-74  period,  despite  the  fact  that  effective  tax 
rates  on  reported  profits  were  fairly  low  by  his- 
torical  standards,  as  the  difference  between  re- 
ported  profits  and  operating  profits  widened.  On 
the  other  hand,  in  1975,  when  inventory  profits 
fell  sharply,  very  low  effective  tax  rates  (by  post- 
war  standards)  on  reported  profits  were  matched 
by  low  effective  tax  rates  on  operating  profits. 
The  share  of  operating  profits  going  to  divi- 
dends  has  also  been  unusually  high  in  the  1970’s. 
The  reasons  for  this  are  not  clear.  Dividends 
tend  to  adjust  slowly  to  changing  profits;  conse- 
quently,  fluctuations  in  the  ratio  of  dividends  to 
reported  and  operating  profits  are  largely  due  to 
short-run  fluctuations  in  profits.  In  particular, 
when  profits  fall  in  recessionary  times,  the  divi- 
dends  to  profits  ratio  tends  to  rise.  However,  an.- 
other  possible  factor  contributing  to  the  unusu.- 
ally  high  ratio  of  dividend  payments  to  operating 
profits  SO  far  in  the  1970’s  could  be  that  firms 
were  focusing  on  reported,  rather  than  operating, 
profits.  This  focus,  combined  with  the  growing 
gap  between  reported  profits  and  operating  pro-- 
fits  as  inflation  accelerated,  would  tend  to  raise 
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ADJUSTMENTS  TO  REPORTED  PROFITS 














-  3.4 
-5.5 
-5.1 
-  5.0 
-6.6 
-18.4 
-  38.5 
-10.8 
Percent  of 
Total  Reported 
CCAA  Adjustments  Profits 
3.8  1.7  -2.5 
3.6  1.9  -2.9 
3.6  .2  -.3 
3.5  -  2.0  2.9 
1.5  -3.6  6.5 
.5  -4.5  7.1 
2.7  -3.9  5.1 
1.6  -16.8  18.1 
-2.1  -40.6  39.1 
-4.1  -  14.9  15.7 
Source:  Bureau  of  Economic  Analysis,  National  Income  and 
Product  Accounts. 
the  share  of  operating  profits  going  to  dividends 
and  decrease  the  share  going  to  net  saving.” 
Some  observers  have,  in  fact,  argued  that  as 
late  as  1974  most  corporations  were  still  focusing 
on  reported  rather  than  operating  profits  in  their 
decision-making  process  and  that  this  focus,  com- 
bined  with  accelerating  inflation,  was  a  factor 
contributing  to  the  falloff  in  operating  profits  in 
the  1970’s  and  especially  in  1973  and  1974.  There 
are  two  types  of  evidence  supporting  this  view. 
The  first  comes  from  a  study  by  ru’ordhaus  [14] 
in  which  he  compares  pricing  equations  based  on 
historical  costs  to  pricing  equations  based  on 
replacement  costs.  The  latter,  which  would 
correspond  to  pricing  to  maintain  operating 
profit  margins,  did  a  much  poorer  job  of  explain- 
ing  the  pricin, Q  decision  than  did  the  former. 
Consequently,  Nordhaus  concluded,  using  data 
through  1973,  that  “It  appears  very  likely  that 
‘WA  illusion’  constitutes  a  very  large  fraction 
of  the  current  profit  squeeze”  [II,  p.  1911.  The 
second  type  of  evidence  is  that  numerous  voices 
within  the  nonfinancial  corporate  sector  have 
acknowledged  the  continued  focus  on  reported 
profits  into  1974.  An  example  is  the  statement 
by  George  Terborgh  :  ‘(It  is  clear  that  American 
business  has  not  yet  learned  to  protect  itself 
against  inflation”  [ 181. 
In  any  case,  by  the  second  half  of  1974  wide- 
spread  attention  was  being  given  to  the  distor- 
tional  impact  of  inflation  on  reported  profits,  and 
j Unfortunately  nothing  conclusive  can  be  said  by  looking  at  the 
aggregate  corporate  data  because  the  dividend  figures  in  the  NIA 
beginning  in  late  19’78 are  not  comparable  with  earlier  yearn.  The 
reason  for  this  is  the  changed  status  of  some  multinational  COY- 
porations-Aramco.  in  particular-in  the  accounts  due  to  increased 
foreign  ownership. 
increasing  focus  was  being  given  to  the  matter 
of  accounting  methods  in  an  age  of  inflation.6  A 
major  consequence  has  been  the  switch  by  many 
corporations  from  First  In,  First  Out  (historical 
cost)  to  Last  In,  First  Out  (replacement  cost) 
accounting  methods.  Under  the  latter,  latest  costs 
become  expenses.  Therefore,  end-of-period  in- 
ventory  is  valued  at  the  cost  of  the  first  units 
purchased  durin  g  the  period  (or  the  cost  of  units 
purchased  in  previous  periods).’  The  conse- 
quence  is  that  in  a  period  of  rising  prices  the 
reported  value  of  end-of-period  inventory  assets 
are  lower,  reported  profits  are  lower,  and  the 
wedge  between  reported  and  operating  profits  is 
diminished. 
As  shown  in  Table  III,  the  IVA  fell  sharply 
in  1975.  The  switch  by  many  firms  to  LIFO 
accounting  methods  undoubtedly  played  a  role  in 
its  fall.  Other  important  factors  were  the  sub- 
stantial  fall  in  the  rate  of  inflation  and  the  net 
reduction  in  inventories. 
Business  management  can  do  nothing  at  pres- 
ent  to  remedy  the  problem  of  a  growing  dis- 
crepancy  between  economic  and  tax  depreciation, 
since  they  must  determine  depreciation  allow- 
ances  on  the  basis  of  historical  costs.  Neverthe- 
less,  the  switch  by  the  Commerce  Department  in 
“Good  examples  of  this  attention  are  IS]  and  1111.  The  distinction 
between  operating  profits  and  reported  profits  has  also  resulted  in 
the  introduction  of  a  new  term-quality  of  earnings-into  the 
stock  market  lexicon. 
ating  profits. 
“Good”  earnings  are  those  related  to  oper- 
7 This  is  an  oversimplification.  The  major  problems  with  the  use 
of  LIFO  methods  are  those  associated  with  the  valuation  of  inven- 
tories  and  the  consequent  difficulties  in  interpreting  profit  state- 
ments,  and  balance  sheet  ratios  that  depend  on  inventory  levels. 
Nelson  [12]  contains  a  discussion  of  these  difficulties. 
Table  IV 
EFFECTIVE TAX  RATES ON  AGGREGATE 
CORPORATE  REPORTED AND  OPERATING  PROFITS 
(Percent) 
Reported  Operating 
Profits  Profits 
1966  42.4  41.4 
1967  42.4  41.2 
1968  46.7  46.6 
1969  48.7  50.2 
1970  49.5  52.9 
1971  47.2  50.9 
1972  44.1  46.5 
1973  42.1  51.5 
1974  41.1  47.6 
1975  38.0  45.6 
Source:  Bureau  of  Economic  Analysis,  National  Income 
ond  Product  Accounts. 
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is  a  major  step  in  recognizing  this  danger. 
A  fourth  factor  that  almost  certainly  had  an 
adverse  effect  on  corporate  profits  and  saving 
during  part  of  the  1970’s  was  price  controls.  The 
evidence  from  several  studies  [4;  14;  161  shows 
that,  given  previous  relationships,  prices  were 
unusually  low  relative  to  costs  in  1971  and  1972 
during  Phase  I  and  Phase  II  of  price  controls. 
As  a  consequence,  profits  failed  to  rebound  as 
sharply  in  the  years  following  the  1970  recession 
as  they  had  following  other  postwar  recessions. 
In  summary,  the  weakness  in  corporate  saving 
in  the  1970’s  to  date  was  the  result  of  several 
factors  including  two  recessions,  high  rates  of 
inflation,  the  increased  share  of  property  income 
going  to  net  interest  payments,  and,  at  least  in 
1971  and  1972,  the  experiment  with  price  controls. 
The  Corporate  Financing  Gap  Net  corporate 
saving  can  be  combined  with  tax  depreciation  and 
foreign  branch  profits  to  get  a  measure  of  gross 
internally  generated  funds.  The  difference  be- 
tween  total  capital  investment  and  gross  internal 
funds-sometimes  called  the  corporate  financing 
gap-corresponds  fairly  closely  to  the  net  funds 
that  corporations  have  to  raise  in  financial  mar- 
kets.  Chart  3  shows  that  corporate  investment 
was  a  fairly  stable  fraction  of  GNP  from  the 
mid-1960’s  through  1974,  although  generally  at 
higher  levels  than  in  previous  years.  Gross  in- 
ternal  funds  relative  to  GNP,  however,  fell  over 
that  period,’  primarily  due  to  the  decline  in  cor- 
porate  saving.  As  a  result  the  ratio  of  the  cor- 
porate  financing  gap  to  GNP  rose  to  very  high 
levels  by  the  end  of  the  period,  almost  twice  the 
previous  postwar  peaks. 
Many  observers  have  argued  that  the  rise  in 
the  corporate  financing  gap  over  this  period  wa.s 
a  major  determinant  of  the  rise  in  interest  rates 
[5;  71.  Their  reasoning  is  fairly  straightforward.. 
Market  interest  rates  are  determined  by  the  de- 
mand  for  and  supply  of  debt  securities.  As  the 
financing  gap  of  corporations  rose  over  the  peri- 
od,  rising  interest  rates  were  necessary  to  outbid 
competing  borrowers,  whose  borrowing  is  more 
interest-sensitive.  The  results  were  higher  in- 
terest  rates  and  a  significantly  greater  share  of 
loanable  funds  goin g  to  the  corporate  sector. 
Chart  4  compares  the  corporate  financing  gap  as 
a  percent  of  GNP  to  an  average  of  short-  and 
long-term  interest  rates  and  provides  support  for 
the  view  that  the  rise  in  the  corporate  financing 
gap  was  an  important  factor  putting  upward  pres- 
sure  on  interest  rates  in  recent  years.s 
S Certain  comments  relating  to  Chart  3  and  Chart  4  are  in  order. 
First,  the numbers are  divided by  GNP  so that  they  can  be compared 
over  time.  Second,  corporations  raise  funds  in  both  the  long-  and 
short-term  debt  markets.  The  use  of  the  simple  average  of  the 
short-  and  long-term  interest  rates  is  intended  to  capture  overall 
interest  rate  pressures.  Third,  the  graphs  and  the  accompanying 
discussion  are  not  meant  to  imply  that  corporate  financing  repuir+ 
ments  are  the  only  determinant  of  the  level  of  interest  rates;  they 
are  simply  intended  to  provide  support  for  the  view  that  the  rising 
level  of  these  requirements  was  an  important  factor  underlying  the 
increase  in  interest  rates. 
Gross  Internal Funds 
Financ;ng Gap 
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Corporate  Saving,  the  Corporate  Balance  Sheet, 
and  Balance  Sheet  Drag  The  weakness  of  cor- 
porate  saving  has  also  been  a  factor  contributing 
to  two  ongoing  debates.  The  first  of  these  de- 
bates  relates  to  the  significance  of  the  state  of 
the  corporate  balance  sheet  as  a  factor  affecting 
economic  activity.  The  discussion  over  the  state 
of  the  corporate  balance  sheet  has  focused  on 
certain  liquidity  and  leverage  ratios  of  categories 
of  items  from  the  aggregate  corporate  balance 
sheet.  Liquidity  ratios  provide  rule-of-thumb 
measures  of  a  firm’s  ability  to  meet  its  maturing 
obligations  when  it  is  subjectkd  to  unexpected 
variations  in  income.  Two  of  the  most  commonly 
cited  aggregate  liquidity  ratios  are  the  ratio  of 
current  assets  (less  inventories)  to  current  liabili- 
ties-the  quick  ratio-and  the  ratio  of  short-term 
debt  to  long-term  debt.  The  higher  the  quick 
ratio  and  the  lower  the  ratio  of  short-term  debt 
to  long-term  debt,  the  more  liquid  is  the  aggre- 
gate  corporate  balance  sheet. 
Leverage  ratios  measure  the  relative  contribu- 
tion  of  creditors  versus  owners  to  the  financing  of 
a  firm.  Two  commonly  cited  aggregate  leverage 
measures  are  the  ratio  of  equity  to  total  assets 
and  the  ratio  of  net  interest  payments  to  property 
income.  The  lower  the  ratio  of  equity  to  assets 
and  the  higher  the  ratio  of  net  interest  payments 
to  property  income,  the  greater  is  the  claim  of 
creditors  to  corporate  income  and  the  greater  is 
the  risk  of  bankruptcy. 
What  are  the  appropriate  levels  of  these  ratios? 
Economic  and  finance  theory  has  very  little  to 
say  about  the  matter.  Nevertheless,  there  is  a 
widespread  belief  among  members  of  the  financial 
and  business  communities  that  these  ratios  as  a 
group  reached  dangerous  levels  by  the  end  of 
1974.  The  state  of  the  aggregate  corporate  bal- 
ance  sheet  at  that  point  was  alternatively  de- 
scribed  as  “fragile,”  “impaired,”  “overburdened,” 
“unstable,”  “imbalanced,”  and  “illiquid.”  The 
behavior  over  rime  of  the  four  ratios  cited  above 
is  shown  in  Chart  5.g  Two  developments  are  par- 
ticularly  noteworthy.  First,  all  the  measures 
have  been  deteriorating  since  the  mid-1960’s.  TWO 
of  the  four  ratios  were  fairly  stable  before  that 
time  while  the  other  two-equity  to  total  assets 
and  current  assets  to  current  liabilities-were 
continuing  trends  that  began  earlier. 
0 These  ratios  while  aidely  cited,  frequently  use  aggregate  balance 
sheet  categories  that  include  different  balance  sheet  items.  The 
consequence  is  that  the  same  ratio  can  look  quite  different  from 
source  to  source.  For  example.  all  bank  loans  are  frequently  in- 
cluded in the short-term  debt category,  whereas  in  Chart  5 long-term 
bank  loans  are  excluded  from  that  category.  If  they  had  been 
included,  the  ratio  would  have  been  higher  but  would  still  show 
the  same  trend.  It  should  also  be  noted  that  current  assets  and 
current  liabilities  in  Chart  5  exclude  trade  credit  and  trade  debt 
since  they  largely  net  out  for  the  corporate  sector  as  a  whole. 
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rise  in  the  corporate  financing  gap,  which  in 
turn  was  closely  related  to  the  decline  in  cor- 
porate  profits  and  corporate  saving.  In  particular, 
the  ratios  deteriorated  most  sharply  in  1966,  1969, 
and  1973  when  the  financing  gap  rose  most  rap- 
idly,  and  deteriorated  least  or  improved  when  the 
financing  gap  declined  during  1967,  1971,  and 
1975.  The  extraordinary  fall  in  the  financing  gap 
in  1975,  in  particular,  was  accompanied  by  a  sub- 
stantial  improvement  in  all  the  ratios. 
The  observed  relationship  between  the  rise  in 
the  corporate  financing  gap  through  1974  and  the 
deterioration  of  the  aggregate  balance  sheet 
ratios  results  from  the  fact  that  a  financing  gap 
must  be  financed  by  depleting  liquid  assets,  in- 
creasing  short-  and  long-term  debt,  or  selling  new 
stock.  If  new  stock  is  not  sold  to  finance  the  gap 
between  investment  and  internally  generated 
funds,  one  or  more  of  the  balance  sheet  ratios 
shown  in  Chart  5  will  deteriorate.  Corporations, 
in  fact,  have  been  reluctant  to  issue  new  stock  in 
recent  years.  Table  V  shows  the  net  funds 
raised  by  corporations  through  stock  sales  as  a 
percent  of  total  net  funds  raised  by  the  corporate 
sector  in  financial  markets.  To  some  extent, 
especially  1974,  the  reluctance  to  sell  stock  was  a 
result  of  the  poor  performance  of  stock  prices. 
Similarly,  in  some  years,  such  as  1971  and  1972, 
rising  stock  prices  have  induced  the  corporate 
sector  to  rely  more  heavily  on  stock  sales.  By 
itself,  however,  the  performance  of  the  stock 
market  cannot  explain  the  dearth  of  new  stock 
issues  in  the  period  covered  in  Table  V.  There 
are  several  other  possible  contributing  factors. 
The  most  important  is  probably  the  differential 
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Interest  payments  by  corporations  to  debtholders 
are  not  subject  to  the  corporate  income  tax, 
while  dividend  payments  to  stockholders  are. 
Consequently,  a  smaller  before-tax  share  of  cor- 
porate  income  is  needed  to  give  an  equal  after-tax 
rate  of  return  to  a  new  debtholder  than  to  a  new 
stockholder.  Thus,  it  is  in  the  interest  of  existing 
stockholders,  up  to  a  point,  for  the  firm  to  fund  its 
financing  gap  through  debt  rather  than  equity.lO 
Another  factor  contributing  to  the  relationship 
between  the  rise  in  the  financing  gap  and  the 
deterioration  of  the  balance  sheet  ratios  was  the 
simultaneous  rise  in  interest  rates.  It  was  argued 
earlier  that  the  financing  gap  was  probably  a  major 
determinant  of  this  rise  in  interest  rates.  What- 
ever  the  cause,  rising  interest  rates  contributed  to 
the  deterioration  of  the  ratios  in  two  ways.  First, 
they  increased  the  incentive  to  finance  short-term 
rather  than  long-term-thereby  adversely  affect- 
ing  the  liquidity  ratios-and  second,  they  directly 
contributed  to  the  proportion  of  property  income 
going  to  net  interest  payments. 
An  additional  factor,  unrelated  to  the  rise  in 
the  financing  gap,  that  had  an  adverse  effect  on 
the  liquidity  ratios  in  recent  years  is  the  greater 
reliance  of  corporations  on  liability  management 
as  a hedge  against  financial  uncertainty.  Accord- 
ing  to  a  recent  study  [ 171,  beginning  in  the  mid- 
1960’s  corporations  sharply  increased  their  use  of 
bank  loan  commitments.  Clearly,  with  a  guaran- 
teed  commitment  of  funds  as  protection  against 
unexpected  fluctuations  in  income,  the  perceived 
need  for  a  “liquid”  balance  sheet  is  lessened. 
Aside  from  the  widespread  talk  of  financial  in- 
stability,  two  concrete  consequences  of  the  dete- 
rioration  of  the  balance  sheet  ratios  are  identifi- 
able.  First,  as  the  aggregate  ratios  deteriorated, 
a greater  number  of  corporate  credit  ratings  were 
lowered  by  the  rating  agencies  [ 11.  These  ratings 
are  a  significant  determinant  of  the  cost  of  bor- 
rowed  funds  for  these  corporations.  Second,  the 
deterioration  in  the  ratios  contributed  to  the  de- 
velopment  of  a  two-tier  market  for  long-term 
funds  in  which  lower-rated  companies  had  an 
increasingly  difficult  time  raising  funds  even  at 
an  increasingly  higher  rate.  The  downward  move- 
ment  in  the  proportion  of  publicly-offered  straight 
bond  offerings  by  corporations  with  a credit  rating  of 
Baa  or  lower  during  the  1966-74  period  is  shown  in 
lo Several  plans  have  been  proposed  to  deal  with  this  problem. 
plan  proposed  by  Henry  Wallich  [19],  which  could  be  implementeRd 
without  the  major  complication  of  an  abrupt  change  in  after-tax 
profits,  would  be  to  place  an  equal  tax  burden  on  all  types  of 
property  income:  interest,  dividends,  and  retained  earnings. 
Table  V 
NET  FUNDS  RAISED  THROUGH  STOCK  SALES 
AS  A  PERCENT OF 
TOTAL  NET  FUNDS  RAISED  BY  THE 
CORPORATE  SECTOR IN  FINANCIAL  MARKETS 
(Percent) 
1960  11.8  1968  -.6 
1961  17.2  1969  8.7 
1962  3.2  1970  14.4 
1963  -2.4  1971  24.4 
1964  7.4  1972  19.7 
1965  0.0  1973  11.0 
1966  5.1  1974  5.3 
1967  8.1  1975  27.8 
Source:  Board  of  Governors  of  the  Federal  Reserve  System, 
Flow  of  Funds. 
Chart  5  along  with  the  balance  sheet  ratios.  The  net 
result  of  these  two  factors  was  that  more  com- 
panies  received  lower  credit  ratings  and  a  smaller 
percentage  of  that  growing  group  were  able  to 
raise  long-term  funds. 
A  third  consequence  of  the  behavior  of  the  bal- 
ance  sheet  ratios  was  increasing  debate  over  their 
impact  on  the  rate  of  growth  in  the  economy  fol- 
lowing  the  1974  recession.  Many  observers  feel 
that  the  state  of  the  corporate  balance  sheet  is  a 
factor  inhibiting  rapid  economic  growth,  at  least 
in  the  near-term,  because  many  corporations  are 
still  in  the  process  of  restructuring  their  balance 
sheets.  Typical  statements  (made  in  the  summer 
of  1975)  from  two  of  the  most  well-known  pro- 
ponents  of  this  view  are: 
Currently,  the  financial  base  of  business  cor- 
porations  needs  substantial  repair  before  this  sec- 
tor  will  be  ready  to  take  a  fling  at  inventory 
speculation  and  at  spending  huge  sums  for  plant 
and  equipment  [Henry  Kaufman,  71. 
Given  the  scare  that  households,  firms  and  finan- 
cial  institutions  had  in  1973-75,  we  can  expect  that 
these  cash  flows  will  be  used  initially  to  increase 
the  robustness  of  balance  sheets,  rather  than  as  a 
basis  for  continuing  the  trends  [similar  to  those 
shown  in  Chart  51  exhibited  in  the  charts  [Hyman 
Minsky,  lo]. 
Many  of  these  same  commentators  argue  not 
only  that  the  recovery  will  be  moderate  but  also 
that  it  should  be  moderate.  Their  reasons  for  this 
view  stem  from  the  behavior  of  the  ratios  shown 
in  Chart  5.  Periods  of  slow  growth  in  recent 
years  have  been  periods  of  decline  in  the  cor- 
porate  financing  gap  and  improvement  in  the 
ratios,  while  periods  of  more  rapid  expansion 
have  been  periods  of  increase  in  the  financing  gap 
and  deterioration  of  the  ratios.  These  observers 
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trends  shown  in  Chart  5.  As  Kaufman  puts  it, 
let  us  recognize  that  a  quick  and  spectacular 
advance  in  economic  activity  would  have  terribly 
adverse  implications  for  the  financial  position  of 
business.  This  is  because  efforts  to  improve  cor- 
porate  liquidity  would  have  to  be  shoved  aside  in 
order  to  meet the  enlarged  new  demand for  inven- 
tory  and  other  real  assets  [7]. 
They  also  note  that  even  though  the  top  tier  of 
higher-rated  corporations  accomplished  substan- 
tial  improvements  in  their  balance  sheets  in  1975, 
the  second  tier  of  lower-rated  firms  made  much 
less  progress.  Parenthetically  it  should  be  noted 
that  from  the  point  of  view  of  these  observers  the 
best  possible  circumstance  would  be  a  continu- 
ation  of  the  rebound  in  corporate  saving  shown 
in  1975,  which  would  allow  a  greater  part  of  ex- 
pansion  of  real  assets  to  be  financed  internally 
than  has  generally  been  the  case  in  recent  years. 
A  central  idea  in  the  above  discussion  is  that 
the  state  of  the  balance  sheet  can  be  a  determi- 
nant,  aride  from  its  impact  on  current  borrowing 
costs,  of  a  firm’s  investment  decisions.  Perhaps 
no  other  idea  is  so  widespread  in  business  and 
financial  circles  and  given  so  little  attention  in 
academic  circles.ir  The  corollary  to  this  idea  is 
that  overburdened  balance  sheets  can  exert  a 
drag  on  economic  activity  as  corporations  reduce 
investment  expenditures  in  an  effort  to  improve 
the  condition  of  their  balance  sheets.  In  the 
extreme,  widespread  efforts  to  restructure  bal- 
ance  sheets  could  result  in  a  self-defeating  decline 
in  income  and  prices  and  a  rise  in  real  debt  bur- 
dens.  While  modern  balance  sheet  watchers  have 
generally  not  raised  this  specter  in  the  inflation- 
ary  environment  of  recent  years,  it  has  in  the 
past  been  a  matter  of  genuine  concern.  As  Irving 
Fisher  put  it  44  years  ago: 
When  a  whole  community  is  in  a  state  of  over- 
indebtedness,  the  dollar  reacts  in  such  a  way  that 
the  very  act  of  liquidation  may  sometimes  enlarge 
the  real  debts  instead  of  reducing  them!  Nomi- 
nally,  of  course,  any  liquidation  must reduce  debts, 
but  really  .  .  .  it  may  swell  the  rreall  uxmaid 
balance  03 every  debt  in  the  country,  :  . .  ~caus!ng] 
a  vicious  spiral  downward-a  tailspin-into  the 
trough  of  depression  13,  p.  251.12 
Corporate  Saving,  Capital  Crunch,  and  the  Cap- 
ital  Shortage  Debate  The  terms  capital  crunch, 
capital  shortage,  and  capital  crisis  have  been 
lIThat  is  not  to  say  that  the  idea  has  never  been  considered. 
M&lam  [9]  has  a  discussion of  the  limited  role  balance  sheets have 
played  in  theoretical  economic  discourses  in  the  past. 
12  Fisher’s  main  prescription  for  preventing  cyclical  fluctuations  in 
debt  from  becoming  depressions  was.  of  course,  to  maintain  a 
13  See  [2]  for  a  study  that  concluded with  the  instantly  famous  line 
stable  real  value  of the  dollar  through  a  stable  money  supply. 
that  “We  can  afford  the  future,  but  just  barely”  and  [13]  for  a 
more  pessimistic  conclusion. 
widely  used  the  last  couple  of  years  in  many 
senses,  which  can  be  broadly  broken  up  into  two 
general  categories  : near-term  and  long-term.  The 
weakness  in  corporate  saving  plays  a role  in  both 
discussions.  The  weakness  in  corporate  profits 
and  saving  in  recent  years  is  the  crux  of  the 
whole  near-term  issue.  As  has  been  shown  in 
this  article,  the  weak  state  of  corporate  saving 
combined  with  fairly  steady  (and  relatively  high) 
corporate  investment  expenditures  to  create  an 
ever-widening  financing  gap.  These  events 
played  an  important  role  in  generating  concern 
over  deteriorating  balance  sheets,  the  develop- 
ment  of  the  two-tier  bond  market,  and  rising 
interest  rates.  The  combined  effects  of  these 
developments  created  a  growing  concern  about 
the  ability  and/or  willingness  of  corporations  to 
continue  to  raise  funds  to  finance  real  investment. 
The  longer-term  use  of  the  term  capital  crisis 
concerns  itself  with  the  adequacy  of  the  projected 
saving  of  various  sectors  of  the  economy  for 
financing  projected  investment  needs.  It  is  be- 
yond  the  scope  of  this  article  to  dwell  at  length 
on  the  numerous  recent  studies  of  the  issue.l’l 
Suffice  it  to  say  that  predictions  concerning  the 
behavior  of  corporate  and  U.  S.  saving  generally 
play  a  major  role  in  the  determination  of  the 
likelihood  of  a  long-term  capital  crisis.  Specifi- 
cally,  these  studies  generally  require  that  to  avoid 
a  capital  shortage  corporate  saving  must  return 
to  levels  more  characteristic  of  the  pre-1970  peri-, 
od  and  that,  within  a  couple  of  years,  the  U.  S. 
Government  budget  deficit  must  be  transformed 
into  a  budget  surplus. 
Although  no  attempt  to  predict  the  future  be-, 
havior  of  corporate  saving  will  be  made  here,  it 
can  be  pointed  out  that  four  factors  were  already 
at  work  in  1975  to  increase  corporate  saving  sig- 
nificantly.  The  two  most  important  develop- 
ments  were  the  rebound  in  economic  activity  and 
the  significant  deceleration  in  the  rate  of  infla- 
tion.  The  third  factor  was  the  decline  in  the 
effective  tax  rate  on  corporate  operating  profits. 
As  indicated  earlier,  the  rise  in  the  effective  tax 
rate  on  aggregate  corporate  operating  profits  in 
the  1970’s  was  largely  an  unintended  result  of  the 
impact  of  inflation,  not  conscious  government 
policy.  The  effective  tax  rate  on  aggregate  re- 
ported  profits  has  declined  every  year  since  1970. 
In  1975  the  effective  tax  rates  on  both  reported 
and  operating  profits  were  at  low  levels  by  post- 
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expand  corporate  saving  was  the  increasing  focus 
on  the  impact  of  inflation  on  operating  profits 
and  corporate  saving.  The  switch  by  many  firms 
to  LIFO  accounting  methods,  the  change  in  the 
treatment  of  capital  consumption  in  the  NIA, 
and  to  some  extent,  the  increase  in  the  invest- 
ment  tax  credit  in  1975  n-ere  all  a  result  of  that 
changing  focus. 
Summary  In  summary,  several  factors  com- 
bined  in  the  1970’s  to  cause  a  prolonged  weak- 
ness  in  net  corporate  saving.  This  weakness  in 
con junction  with  relatively  high  capital  expendi- 
tures  created  unusually  large  external  financing 
requirements,  which,  along  with  other  factors, 
contributed  to  the  deterioration  of  the  aggregate 
corporate  balance  sheet  and  helped  spur  the 
capital  shortage  debate.  Last  year  saw  a  strong 
resurgence  of  corporate  operating  profits  and 
saving,  an  extraordinary  decline  in  external  finan- 
cing  requirements,  and  a  significant  improvement 
in  the  aggregate  corporate  balance  sheet  ratios. 
A  consequence  of  these  developments  has  been  a 
marked  decline  in  the  intensity  of  the  debates 
over  the  state  of  the  corporate  balance  sheet  and 
the  presence  of  a  capital  crisis.  If  the  factors 
that  contributed  to  the  deterioration  of  corporate 
saving  reappear,  however,  a  resurgence  of  these 
debates  can  be  expected. 
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